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HIS article reviews legislative and case law developments in the
areas of wills, nontestamentary transfers, heirship, estate adminis-
tration, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey period covers deci-
sions published between October 1, 1994, and September 30, 1995, and
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changes to the Probate Code, the Property Code, and other codes and
statutes enacted by the Seventy-Fourth Texas Legislature that affect the
areas of probate and trusts.
I. WILLS
A. WILL CONTESTS
In Hawkins v. Estate of Volkmann,' the court examined sanctions
against a will contestant's attorney.2 The contestant initially contested
the probate of the testator's will. An interested party had offered the will
and a codicil to the Menard county court for probate. The presiding
judge in the Menard county court was an interested party to the will and
he recused himself. The judge appointed to preside in the county judge's
place appointed the county judge and another interested person as tem-
porary administrators of the estate. The contestant contested the ap-
pointment of the temporary administrators. Following transfer of the
proceedings to the district court, the contestant attempted to disqualify
the district judge or to have the district judge recuse himself, and after-
wards contested most of the actions of the administrators and the district
court. The district court determined in a summary judgment proceeding
that the contestant was not a party interested in the estate, severed the
will contest, and dismissed the contestant. The contestant appealed the
summary judgment, and the appeals court upheld the trial court's judg-
ment dismissing the contestant.3 The contestant, however, continued to
file objections to the judge sitting in the case and to the administrators'
requests to pay debts. The contestant also alleged that she had standing
to contest the matters in a fiduciary capacity rather than in her individual
capacity. The trial court, after a hearing that lasted over two months,
awarded sanctions against both the contestant and her attorney. The con-
testant failed to meet the deadline for filing her cost bond on appeal, and
she filed no motion for extension of time for filing the appeal bond,
hence, the appeals court dismissed her appeal for want of jurisdiction.4
The contestant's attorney perfected his appeal, but continued to pursue
his client's claims, despite the fact that the contestant no longer had an
issue before the appeals court. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's
granting of sanctions against the attorney, but remanded the case for a
redetermination of the amount of the sanctions. 5 The court found that
the trial court erred in assessing sanctions against the attorney for all
costs and expenses rather than just the costs and expenses associated with
1. 898 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
2. Id. at 336-37.
3. The appellate decision was not published. See In re Estate of Volkmann, No. 04-
92-00532-CV, 04-91-00691-CV, and 04-91-00380-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no
writ)(not designated for publication).
4. Hawkins and Snodgrass v. Estate of Volkmann, No. 04-93-00136-CV (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1993, no writ) (not designated for publication).
5. 898 S.W.2d at 337.
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the attorney's harassing behavior. 6 The court found that the trial court
could not include the costs necessary for maintaining a will contest in the
amount of the sanctions.7
In Mackie v. McKenzie,8 the court affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of the defendants in an action for legal malpractice
arising from a will contest.9 The testator, who was a medical doctor, died
in early 1988, and the trial court shortly thereafter admitted his 1984 will
to probate. The testator had executed a will in 1980 in which he left
$50,000 plus personal effects to his niece and about $600,000 to his niece's
children. The 1984 will gave the niece approximately $200,000 more than
the 1980 will, but lowered the amount to each of her two children to
$10,000 plus some personal effects. The residue of the testator's estate
passed to two charities, Baylor University Medical Center Foundation
and Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas. Baylor University Medical Center
Foundation had paid an attorney to draft the 1984 will. The niece unsuc-
cessfully attempted to reach a settlement with the two charities after she
learned of the Foundation's involvement with preparation of the 1984
will. The niece, however, became concerned when the executor of her
uncle's estate filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have various
payments that the testator made to his niece during his lifetime character-
ized as loans, which would be deducted from the niece's gift under the
1984 will. The niece contacted a lawyer about the declaratory judgment
action, and they discussed a contest of the 1984 will. The niece gave the
lawyer a retainer to begin work on the matter, and they agreed that the
lawyer would receive a contingent fee if he took the case. The lawyer
then filed an opposition to the 1984 will based on undue influence by
Baylor University Medical Foundation-but the lawyer filed the opposi-
tion solely on the part of the niece and did not include her two children.
The niece requested the lawyer to amend the pleadings to include her
children, but the lawyer failed to do so. The niece later requested that
the lawyer write her an opinion letter concerning what she might recover
in the will contest. The lawyer refused to write the opinion letter, and the
niece terminated his representation. The lawyer filed a motion to with-
draw in the case, which the niece did not oppose, and the court entered
an order granting the motion to withdraw. On the day following the trial
court's order allowing the lawyer to withdraw, the lawyer's associate con-
tacted the, niece's son to notify him of a hearing on a motion for partial
summary judgment and the deadline for a written response. The niece
did not obtain substitute counsel prior to the hearing, and the court
granted the motion for summary judgment. The niece later engaged an-
other attorney, and she entered into a settlement with her uncle's estate
and the two charities, in which she agreed to withdraw her contest of the
6. Id. at 338-39.
7. Id. at 338-39.
8. 900 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied).
9. Id. at 452.
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1984 will and to accept a sum in payment of her gift under the 1984 will.
The niece and her children then sued her first lawyer, his associate, and
his law firm for legal malpractice. The trial court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment. In an order for the niece and her children
to prevail on the malpractice claim they would have to establish that they
would have prevailed in the will contest except for their lawyer's negli-
gence. 10 The appeals court considered summary judgment evidence con-
cerning the testator's involvement with Baylor Hospital and Presbyterian
Hospital during his lifetime, the testator's physical and mental health at
the time he executed the 1984 will, and the provisions that the testator
made for other relatives and individuals, as well as to other charities with
which he was involved." The court noted that the testator's residual gifts
to the charities were consistent with his charitable nature and with his
close association -with the two charities during his life.12 The court con-
cluded that the summary judgment evidence established as a matter of
law that the niece and her children would not have prevailed in their
contest of the 1984 will on the basis of undue influence. 13 The appeals
court also found that the niece received more under the settlement agree-
ment than she would have received under the 1980 will, which would
have been the amount she would have received if she had successfully
contested the 1984 will, so the niece suffered no damages.' 4
In Thompson v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P.,15 the court determined that
family members have no right to prevent a testator from changing his
will16 and that the testator's accountants had no duty to tell the testator's
wife and daughter of the changed will.' 7 The testator was the majority
shareholder in a closely held business. The testator wished to preserve
his estate for the benefit of his family and, ultimately, for his two
grandchildren. After the testator discussed his wishes concerning his es-
tate with his accountant and other advisors, he had a new will prepared in
which he left his company stock in trust for the benefit of his daughter for
her lifetime, after which it would pass to her children. The testator also
provided in his new will that no member of his family could serve as the
president or chief executive officer of the closely held business, and he
added a no contest clause to the will. The testator asked his accountant
to tell no one about the new will. The testator died two months after he
executed his new will, and the will was admitted to probate two weeks
after his death. More than two years after the probate of the will, his wife
and daughter obtained a copy of the testator's previous will which left his
10. Id. at 449.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 450.
13. Id. at 451. The court, citing Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 923 (Tex.
1963), stated that "a will cannot be set aside on proof of facts which at most do no more
than show an opportunity to exercise influence." 900 S.W.2d at 451.
14. 900 S.W.2d at 451.
15. 902 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 16.
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closely held stock to his daughter outright. The testator's wife and daugh-
ter filed suit against the testator's accountant because the accountant did
not tell the testator's family about the new will. The wife and daughter
claimed that the accountant tortiously interfered with their inheritance
rights by not revealing the new will. The appeals court found that the
wife and daughter could not prevail on their claim of tortious interference
because the wife and daughter could not contest the probate court's ad-
mission of the will to probate more than two years after the admission. 18
The wife and daughter did not contest the will, but instead asserted that
the accountant had a duty to advise them of the new will. The wife and
daughter sought recovery of the amounts they would have received under
the former will as damages. The court held that the accountant had no
duty to advise the wife and daughter of the testator's execution of a new
will.19
In Harkins v. Crews,20 the court determined, among other things, that
the trial court properly rendered a declaratory judgment that a will and
its codicils were invalid.21 The testator executed a will in 1983 and subse-
quently amended the will with two codicils. The 1983 will left the largest
part of his estate to his two children from his first marriage. The testator
executed a new will in 1987, in which he left the bulk of his estate to his
second wife, and which he also amended by two codicils. In 1990 the
testator executed a third will, together with a codicil dated the same date
as the third will, in which he left an even larger portion of his estate to his
second wife. The second wife destroyed the 1983 will and codicils outside
of the testator's presence. Following the testator's death, the second wife
filed an application to probate the 1990 will and codicil. The testator's
children challenged the 1990 will, alleging, among other things, undue in-
fluence and lack of testamentary capacity. The second wife did not offer
the 1987 will and its codicils for probate following the will contest, so the
children applied to the court for a declaratory judgment that the 1987 will
and codicils were invalid. The jury found that the testator lacked testa-
mentary capacity at the time he executed the 1987 will and codicils as well
18. Id. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon 1995) provides that the statutory period
for contesting a will expires two years after the date the court admits the will to probate.
The court found that the wife and daughter had no inheritance expectancy after the statu-
tory contest period because the probate court order admitting the will to probate was final
and conclusive. 902 S.W.2d at 16.
19. 902 S.W.2d at 16. The court found that the accountant had a duty to the testator
not to disclose his confidences. Id. The court further found that no cause of action exists
in Texas for a lost opportunity for preventing a testator from changing his will. Id. The
court held that the accountant did not damage the wife and daughter by holding the confi-
dences of the testator and by advising him concerning his new will. Id. at 17. The court
noted that the jury found that the accountant had no accountant-client relationship with
either the wife or the daughter concerning the testator's estate and that sufficient evidence
existed to support the jury's finding. Id at 18. Finally, the court held that the wife and
daughter were not "consumers" as defined in Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4)(Vernon 1987), so they had no standing to sue the accountant
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 902 S.W.2d at 19.
20. 907 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ requested).
21. 1& at 57.
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as the 1990 will and codicil, and further found that the testator executed
the 1990 will and codicil under undue influence. The jury also found that
the second wife and her attorney, who drew the 1987 will and codicils and
the 1990 will and codicil, tortiously interfered with the children's inheri-
tance rights. The children had offered a copy of the 1983 will for probate,
and the trial court admitted the 1983 will. The second wife appealed,
alleging that the trial court should not have submitted any issues concern-
ing the 1987 will to the jury and should not have entered a declaratory
judgment that the 1987 will and codicils were invalid. The appeals court
found that the declaratory judgment concerning the 1987 will and its codi-
cils was proper since the judgment finally determined the disposition of
the testator's estate and the rights of the parties.2 2 The court further held
that the second wife had the burden of proving the testator's capacity at
the time he executed the 1987 will and codicils 23 and that the jury's find-
ing that the testator did not have capacity when he executed the 1987 and
1990 wills discharged the children's burden of proof that the testator did
not revoke the 1983 will.24 The court, in considering the children's cross-
points of error, held that the trial court committed no error in charging
the costs of temporary administration against the estate rather than
against the second wife,2 5 that the second wife and her children filed the
1990 will and codicil in good faith,2 6 and that the trial court committed no
error in awarding attorney's fees to the proponents of the 1990 will.27
B. WILL CONSTRUCTION
In Davis v. Shanks,28 the court held that the trial court incorrectly
granted summary judgment when a term contained in the will was ambig-
22. Id. The court found that the trial court had broad powers over the proceeding,
that the Declaratory Judgments Act is comprehensive in nature (historical statutes not
available), that the probate code mandates the court to consider all applications for pro-
bate in a single proceeding, and that the trial court's judgment furthered the public policy
of judicial economy. 907 S.W.2d at 57 (relying on TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 37.001 et. seq. (Vernon 1986) and TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 83(a) (Vernon 1980)).
23. 907 S.W.2d at 58. The second wife sought to establish that the testator revoked his
1983 will through the execution of the 1987 will and codicils, and the execution of the 1990
will and codicil. The court held that the party who seeks to establish revocation by a subse-
quent written document has the burden of establishing that the testator had testamentary
capacity when he executed the subsequent document. Id.
24. Id. at 59. The court found that the children established that the testator did not
revoke his 1983 will by presenting evidence that the testator did not have testamentary
capacity for executing the 1987 and 1990 wills and by proving that the testator did not
revoke the 1983 will by physically destroying it. Id. The court also found that the codicils
to the 1983 will, which the trial court did not admit to probate, did not revoke the 1983 will
because the codicils did not contain language specifically revoking the 1983 will. Id. at 60.
25. Id. at 61.
26. Id. at 63-64. The attorney who drafted the 1990 will was also an applicant for
probate. He was the successor executor named in the will, and he sought letters testamen-
tary after the second wife declined to serve. The court found that the attorney also acted in
good faith. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 64.
28. 898 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1995).
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uous.2 9 The testator left his house and all contents except for certain
specified items to a friend. The testator left the residue of his estate to
other persons. The testator placed certificates of stock valued at more
than $200,000 in a bag belonging to the friend. The testator then wrote
the friend a letter, to be opened only upon his death, advising the friend
where the certificates were and that he intended the friend to have the
certificates following his death. The executor asked the trial court for a
construction of the will, since both the residuary beneficiaries and the
friend claimed the stock certificates. The residuary beneficiaries re-
quested a summary judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, the
contents of the house did not include the stock certificates. The friend
offered the letter to show the testator's intent concerning the certificates,
but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the residual
beneficiaries. The appeals court held that the term "contents" was not
ambiguous as a matter of law and that the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment in favor of the residual beneficiaries. 30 The supreme
court determined that the term "contents" was ambiguous at the time of
the testator's death and that the trial court should have considered the
friend's extrinsic evidence. 31
In Calhoun v. Killian,32 the court determined that a combined lease/
will contained an ambiguity about whether the testator intended for the
lessee beneficiaries to receive only the surface interest in the property, or
both the surface and the mineral interest. 33 The decedent had not pro-
vided in a written lease that she was leasing all of her real property lying
north of a certain highway to the lessees for agricultural purposes for a
five-year term. The lease also provided that if the lessor died during the
term of the lease she intended for a fee simple interest in the real prop-
erty to vest in the lessees. Following the decedent's death, the lessees
filed the deed/will for probate and later requested a determination of the
heirs who would receive the estate's mineral interests. The decedent
owned mineral interests south of the highway, which everyone agreed
passed to her heirs, but the heirs and the surviving lessee disagreed about
the mineral interests on the land conveyed under the lease/will. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the surviving lessee, finding
that the lease/will devised title to the mineral interests to the lessee. The
heirs appealed, contending that the lease was ambiguous. The appeals
court found that the words "all of the land owned" by the testator were
ambiguous, and could include the surface only, or could include the full
29. Id. at 286.
30. Davis v. Shanks, No. 06-94-00031-CV (Tex. App.-Texarkana, Aug. 25, 1994), 1994
WL 810057, rev'd, 898 S.W. 2d 285 (Tex. 1995).
31. 898 S.W.2d 285, 286. The court noted that the Legislature amended TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 58(d) (Vernon Supp. 1995) subsequent to the testator's death to provide that
contents could not include titled personal property, such as stock certificates. Id. (citing
Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 6, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3337, 3340).
32. 888 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, writ denied).
33. Id. at 54.
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estate.34 The court noted that it could not determine the decedent's in-
tent by reviewing the four corners of the lease/will.35
In Miller v. Wilson,36 the court construed a will to determine the nature
of the testator's gift of the family home to his second wife. The testator
and his first wife built their family home in 1935. The testator's first wife
died intestate in 1951, and her community one-half interest in the home
passed to their two children. The testator remarried in 1958 and he and
his second wife lived in the family home until his death in 1987. The
testator left his second wife a life estate in the family home and gave her
the power to sell the home. The testator provided that if his second wife
sold the home, she should divide the proceeds with his two children, with
each child to receive one-fourth of the proceeds and his second wife to
receive one-half of the proceeds. Following the testator's death, his sec-
ond wife sought a declaratory judgment concerning her interest in the
property. The court found that the testator specifically provided for his
second wife to have a life estate in the property,37 and that the life estate
was only in the testator's one-half interest in the property.38 The court
further held that the testator intended for his wife to receive one-half of
his one-half, or one-fourth, of the proceeds when the house sold. 39
C. CONTRACrUAL WILL
In Estate of Gibson,40 the court examined a joint and contractual will
and determined that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the surviv-
ing party to the joint will had the power to dispose of property in which
she received a life estate under the joint will.41 The testators of the joint
will, a husband and wife, executed the will in 1957. The husband later
died, and the wife offered the joint will for probate. The wife received a
life estate in her husband's property under the terms of the joint will.
Following her husband's death, the wife opened nine savings accounts
with other parties. The signature cards for each of the savings accounts
attempted to create rights of survivorship in the surviving parties.42 The
wife also executed a new will in 1983 in which she attempted to convey
34. Id
35. Id. The court also found that the fact that the heirs did not prove that the lessee
could not claim the mineral interests under the doctrine of estoppel because the lessee
alleged that he mistakenly listed the mineral interests as separate from the surface estate in
connection with the probate proceeding. Id. at 55. Thus, the court concluded that the trial
court could not have entered summary judgment for the heirs based upon an estoppel
theory. Id.
36. 888 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
37. Id. at 161, 162.
38. Id. The court stated that the testator could not leave his widow more than he
owned. Id. at 161.
39. Id. at 162. The court modified the judgment of the trial court, which awarded the
widow one-half of the total proceeds from the sale of the home. Id.
40. 893 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
41. Id. at 752.
42. Seeinfra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nontestamen-
tary transfer issues in Estate of Gibson.
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her property differently than under the 1957 contractual will. Following
the wife's death her daughter attempted to probate the 1983 will, but the
appeals court ruled that the 1957 will was contractual and that the wife
received a life estate under the terms of the 1957 will.43 The trial court
then admitted the 1957 will to probate, but ruled that the wife had the
right to dispose of the funds in the savings accounts and that the funds in
the savings accounts were not part of the estate passing under the 1957
will. The husband's son appealed the trial court's conclusions of law con-
cerning the wife's ability to dispose of the life estate property. The ap-
peals court examined the 1957 will and determined that it did not
specifically give the wife the power or right to dispose of the life estate
property.44 The appeals court, however, found that the wife had the
power to dispose of her separate property that she acquired after the
death of her husband.4 5 The appeals court remanded the case for a deter-
mination of whether the wife's savings accounts consisted of funds that
the wife acquired after her husband's death or funds traceable to assets
that the couple owned at the time of the husband's death.46
D. WILL EXECUTION
In Phillips v. Najar,47 the court determined that the testator's instruc-
tion to another to affix her signature to her will with a rubber stamp com-
plied with the requirements of Probate Code section 59,48 but even if the
rubber stamp did not meet statutory requirements, the testator signed the
will by marking "X's" on either side of the rubber stamp.49 The testator
went to a notary's office to execute her will. TWo witnesses were present
in addition to the notary, the testator, and the individual named as in-
dependent executor in the testator's will. The testator was physically un-
able to sign her name, so she instructed the named independent executor
to affix her signature to the will with a rubber stamp. After the named
43. 893 S.W.2d at 751. The appeals court reversed and remanded the trial court's ad-
mission of the 1983 will to probate in an unpublished opinion. Gibson v. Gibson, No. 06-
92-00054-CV (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
44. 893 S.W.2d at 752. The court noted that the will did not give the wife the power to
convey any part of the life estate property, id., so that the language in the 1957 will was
similar to the language in the will examined in Dickerson v. Yarbrough, 212 S.W.2d 975,
979 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1948, no writ), in which the court found that the survivor had
no power to sell or dispose of the estate. 893 S.W.2d at 752.
45. 893 S.W.2d at 752. The court found that the language of the will created an ambi-
guity about whether the surviving spouse could dispose of property acquired after the
death of the first spouse to die. Id. Because the language in the will created an ambiguity,
the court found that the rule set forth in Knolle v. Hunt, 551 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.), did not apply to the 1957 will. 893 S.W.2d at 752. The court in
Knolle v. Hunt determined that a contractual will could control the disposition of after-
acquired property if the plain language of the will specifically and unambiguously states
the intention of the parties to do so. 551 S.W.2d at 761-62.
46. 893 S.W.2d at 753.
47. 901 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1995, n.w.h.).
48. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59(a) (Vernon 1980) provides that the testator shall sign
the will or instruct another person to sign the will in the testator's presence.
49. 902 S.W.2d at 562.
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independent executor complied with the testator's wishes, the testator
placed an "X" at each end of her stamped signature. The two witnesses
initialed next to each "X" and signed the will. The testator stated to the
witnesses and the notary that she had read the will and that it expressed
her last will and testament. The appellant contended that the document
did not meet the requirements found in Probate Code section 5950 for
execution of a will. The court found that if a testator can instruct another
person to sign her will at her direction, then the testator may also instruct
another person to affix her signature with a rubber stamp.51 The court
further found that even if the signature by rubber stamp were not suffi-
cient for proper execution of the will, the "X's" made by the testator
were sufficient for execution of the will.52
E. HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
In Matter of Rogers,53 the court examined three documents and deter-
mined that the first document was a holographic will,54 that the second
document served to revoke the first document, 55 and that the third docu-
ment did not meet the formal requirements of Probate Code section 6356
for a valid testamentary instrument. 57 The testator executed a document
in 1959, which she titled a codicil to her will. The document was in the
testator's handwriting, and she stated her clear intent concerning the dis-
tribution of her estate upon her death. The court held that the 1959 docu-
ment was testamentary in nature. 58 The court then found that the
document executed in 1989, which was the latest of the three documents,
did not meet the requirements for a formal revocation of a will.59 The
court then examined the handwritten 1988 document, found that the 1988
document specifically purported to revoke all previous wills and codicils,
and determined that it could not overturn the trial court's finding that the
1988 document revoked the 1959 will.60
50. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
51. 901 S.W.2d at 562.
52. Id. The court noted that the appellant did not challenge the testator's marks on
the will and that his challenge to the use of the rubber stamp is a challenge to the testator's
extra precautions concerning the execution of the will. Id.
53. 895 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-yler 1994, writ denied).
54. Id. at 377.
55. Id. at 378.
56. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 63 (Vernon 1980) provides that a testator may revoke a
written will with a document that is a "subsequent will, codicil, or declaration in writing,
executed with like formalities" as the original will.
57. 895 S.W.2d at 377.
58. Id. at 377. The court noted that the use of the term "codicil" to describe the docu-
ment did not change its testamentary nature. Id.
59. Id. The 1989 document was a typewritten document that contained various dates,
but the earliest date on the document was in September 1989. The parties stipulated at
trial that the 1989 document was not a valid testamentary instrument. The appeals court
thus held that the 1989 document did not revoke the 1959 will because the testator did not
execute it with the requisite formalities. Id.
60. Id. at 378. On motion for rehearing, the court held that the appellant could not
raise for the first time the issue of whether the 1988 document was in the testator's hand-
writing, especially since the appellant had previously stipulated that the 1988 document
1254 [Vol. 49
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In Estate of Johnson,61 the court affirmed the trial court's determina-
tion that an alleged holographic will was not in the decedent's handwrit-
ing.62 The decedent's sister offered the alleged holographic will, under
which she was the only beneficiary, for probate, and she sought appoint-
ment as administrator of the decedent's Texas estate. The decedent's son
contested the probate on the bases that the will was not in the decedent's
handwriting and that he was the decedent's sole heir. The trial court
found that the alleged will was not wholly in the decedent's handwriting
and that no witness signed the alleged will. The trial court concluded that
since the will was not wholly in the decedent's handwriting and it was not
witnessed, the decedent did not execute the purported will with the requi-
site formalities for the execution of a valid will. The appeals court deter-
mined that the trial court, as the finder of fact, properly based its findings
of facts and conclusions of law upon the evidence submitted.63
F. GiFr IN LIEU OF WILL
In Molnari v. Palmer,64 the court affirmed the trial court's judgment
that the grantor did not sign a deed as the result of undue influence. 65
Because the grantor and his wife, who was in poor health, wished to en-
sure that title to their farm would pass to the wife's grandchildren, they
hired an attorney to prepare a deed transferring the farm to the wife's
grandson, as trustee for the benefit of the wife's daughter and grandchil-
dren. The grantors retained life estates in the property. The grandson
had accompanied the grantors to the attorney's office, and he was present
when the grantors signed the deed. The grandson did not record the deed
until the day of his grandmother's funeral, several weeks after the execu-
tion of the deed. Following his wife's death the grantor attempted to
have the deed set aside alleging failure of consideration, or, alternatively,
fraud and undue influence. The trial court gave instructed verdicts on the
issues of failure of consideration and undue influence and submitted the
issues of fraud and mental capacity to the jury. The jury found in favor of
the grandson. The appeals court found that, although the grandson made
the initial appointment with the lawyer, took the grantor to the lawyer's
was a holographic will that was invalid because of interlineations by persons other than the
testator. Id. at 378-79.
61. 886 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, n.w.h.).
62. Id. at 873.
63. Id. The sister argued that she met her burden of proof in establishing that the
purported will was in the decedent's handwriting because she provided testimony of two
witnesses, another of the decedent's sisters and herself. The appeals court stated that this
testimony amounted to opinion evidence since neither of the sisters saw the decedent exe-
cute the purported will. Id. at 872. The appeals court found that the trial court properly
considered the testimony as raising a factual issue only, rather than establishing that the
will was in the decedent's handwriting as a matter of law. Id. at 872. The trial court consid-
ered several exhibits containing undisputed samples of the decedent's handwriting, as well
as the testimony of the decedent's sisters, in making its findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
64. 890 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, n.w.h.).
65. Id. at 148-50.
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office, and was present when the grantors signed the deed, he took all of
these actions at the request of the grantor, so he did not exert undue
influence.66 The court also found that no evidence existed that the grand-
son brought any external pressure on his grandparents to sign the deed.67
The court finally found that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the deed showed the grantors' intention to make a gift of the
property, so that no consideration was necessary. 68
II. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
In Estate of Gibson,6 9 the court examined signature cards from several
of the decedent's savings accounts and determined that the cards created
valid rights of survivorship. 70 The signature cards on the savings accounts
stated that the parties to the accounts held the accounts "as joint tenants
with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common and not as ten-
ants by the entirety."'71 The signature cards also stated that any deposits
to each account by any party to the account would result in a pro rata gift
to the other parties to the account, with delivery at the time of the de-
posit. The signature cards did not contain the specific language found in
Probate Code section 439(a), 72 but the court found that the language on
the signature cards satisfied the requirements found in Chopin v. In-
terFirst Bank Dallas73 for creating valid survivorship rights.74
III. HEIRSHIP
In Crowson v. Wakeham,75 the Texas Supreme Court adopted a test for
determining whether a probate order is interlocutory or final76 and held
that the time period for filing an appeal in the instant case began when
the trial court severed the appellant's cause of action from the remaining
issues, not from when the trial court entered an order finding that the
appellant was not an heir of the decedent. 77 Following the decedent's
death, a party filed a will for probate, claiming it was the decedent's will.
A woman who alleged that she was the decedent's common law wife then
66. Id. at 149. The court noted that the grantor testified that he did not rely on his
grandson's advice. Id.
67. Id. at 150.
68. Id. The court noted the testimony of the attorney who prepared the deed and the
grandson that the grantors intended the deed to be a gift in lieu of a will. Id.
69. 893 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, n.w.h.).
70. Id at 753. For a discussion of the issues concerning the contract will in this case,
see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
71. 893 S.W.2d at 753.
72. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
73. 694 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. 893 S.W.2d at 753. The court cited Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.
1990), for the proposition that the language found in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a)(Vernon Supp. 1995) is not the exclusive method for creating survivorship rights. 893
S.W.2d 753.
75. 897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995).




filed a will contest. Other heirs of the decedent later intervened, con-
testing the will and contesting the alleged common law marriage. One of
the heirs filed an application for determination of heirship, in which she
alleged that the decedent had a will in which he left all of his estate to his
mother, who predeceased him, so that an heirship determination was nec-
essary to ascertain who should receive the decedent's property. The orig-
inal will applicant withdrew the alleged will and took a nonsuit, leaving
only the heirship determination. The other heirs moved for a partial sum-
mary judgment finding that no common law marriage existed, and the
trial court entered a partial summary judgment against the alleged com-
mon law wife. The alleged wife filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the trial court denied, and the trial court, some two months later, severed
the partial summary judgment from all other issues in the heirship deter-
mination. The alleged wife filed an appeal that was timely from the date
of the severance order, but that was not timely from the date of the par-
tial summary judgment. The court of appeals, on its own motion, re-
quested all parties to submit briefs concerning whether the partial
summary judgment order was final or interlocutory. The court of appeals
then determined that it had no jurisdiction over the appeal because the
alleged wife did not timely perfect the appeal. The supreme court noted
that the trial court's conclusions concerning the alleged wife's claims did
not dispose of all of the issues concerning the heirship determination.
78
The court held that the partial summary judgment against the alleged
wife, whether under the rule that it adopted in this case or under prior
case law, was interlocutory in nature and that the alleged wife could not
appeal until the trial court severed her cause from the other
proceedings.79
In Smith v. Little,80 the court reversed a summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations and public policy.81 The appellant was adopted
before she reached one year of age, but the appellant's adoptive mother
never told appellant her natural mother's name. Following her adoptive
mother's death, the appellant sought to gather information on her natural
family and learned the name of her natural mother from Hope Cottage.
In 1989, prior to the time Hope Cottage gave appellant her birth records,
appellant found a scrap of paper which she believed listed her natural
mother and father. The information from Hope Cottage later listed the
same woman as appellant's natural mother. When appellant learned that
her alleged natural mother was dead, she contacted her alleged natural
uncle about obtaining family medical records. The alleged uncle main-
tained that he did not know of appellant's birth and that he could not
believe that she was the natural daughter of his sister. Appellant's natu-
78. Id. at 782-83. The court acknowledged that its previous decisions created ambigu-
ity and uncertainty as to when an order became appealable and determined to adopt a test
for making a determination. Id. at 783.
79. Id. at 783.
80. 903 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ granted).
81. Id. at 788.
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ral mother died in 1969, survived by two children of her marriage and her
own mother. Following the natural grandmother's death in 1982, the un-
cle served as executor of his mother's estate. The uncle distributed the
estate and filed an affidavit closing administration of the estate almost
two years following his mother's death. In 1991, almost eight years after
her alleged grandmother's estate closed, appellant filed suit against the
uncle for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and gross negli-
gence, asking for damages equal to the amount that she would have re-
ceived as a beneficiary of her alleged grandmother's estate, as well as
punitive damages, attorney's fees, and interest. Appellant alleged that
the uncle and other relatives knew of her existence and intentionally ex-
cluded her from division of her grandmother's estate. The uncle sought a
summary judgment, which the trial court granted, based upon the statute
of limitations and public policy concerning finality of estates. The appeals
court found that fact issues existed concerning when the appellant knew
or should have known about the wrongful deprivation of her inheritance
rights82 and about when appellant should have known about the identity
of her natural mother and about her exclusion as a beneficiary of the
estate.83 The court upheld the trial court's conclusions that appellant had
no remedies for constructive trust, accounting and partition because of
public policy interests in the finality of distributing estates. 84 The court
remanded the case for additional proceedings on the appellant's claims




In Lake v. Lake,86 the court determined that the beneficiaries under a
will should not receive credit for social security benefits paid for the dece-
dent's minor child's benefit against a claim filed by the minor child's
mother for child support payments.87 The decedent and his ex-wife di-
vorced in 1976, and as part of the agreement incident to the divorce, de-
cedent agreed that the child support obligations under the agreement
would continue after his death. The decedent died in 1989 while his
youngest child was still a minor. In 1991 the ex-wife sued the benefi-
ciaries under the decedent's will for recovery of the decedent's child sup-
port obligations, and the trial court entered a take nothing judgment
against the ex-wife. The ex-wife appealed, and the appeals court reversed
and rendered judgment for child support obligations, but remanded the
case for a determination of whether any credit for social security benefits
82. Id. at 786.
83. Id. at 787.
84. Id. at 788.
85. 903 S.W. 2d at 788.
86. 899 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1995, n.w.h.).
87. Id. at 741.
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applied.8s The trial court found that the beneficiaries should receive a
credit for social security benefits paid, which exceeded the amount the
ex-wife should have received under the divorce agreement. On appeal
for the second time, the court held that no credit for payment of social
security benefits should apply.8 9
In Olson v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline,90 the court found that
the attorney's death rendered his appeal moot 9' and that the judgment
against the deceased attorney was not an enforceable claim against his
estate. 92 The trial court granted a summary judgment to the Commission
for Lawyer Discipline and suspended the attorney's license for five years,
with the first year as an active suspension and the remaining term as a
probated suspension. The trial court further ordered the attorney to re-
imburse the State Bar for its costs in connection with the action against
him, commencing with the date his active suspension ended. The attor-
ney died after perfecting his appeal. The attorney's wife made a motion
to substitute herself in the attorney's place, and the appeals court granted
her motion, but requested both parties to submit briefs concerning
whether the attorney's death rendered his appeal moot. The court found
that the sole nature of the trial action was a determination of whether the
attorney violated any of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct93 and, if so, the sanctions for his conduct.94 Because the attor-
ney was deceased, the court reasoned that any outcome from the appeal
would have no effect.95 The court also found that because the trial court
tied the attorney's duty to reimburse the State Bar to his probationary
period, the State Bar would have no claim for the reimbursement against
the attorney's estate.96
In Carter v. Kahler,97 the court considered the presentation and classifi-
cation of a claim from a medical malpractice judgment against the dece-
dent.98 The probate court granted letters testamentary in the decedent's
estate on January 8, 1991. On February 19, 1991, less than six months
after the original grant of letters testamentary, the appellants in this case
88. Lake v. Lake, No. 05-92-02111-CV, 1993 WL 342588 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no
writ)(not designated for publication).
89. Id. at 741. The court noted that social security survivor benefits existed at the time
the decedent and his ex-wife divorced and that the parties did not address social security
benefits in their otherwise comprehensive divorce agreement. Id. Because the agreement
did not address a credit or offset for social security survivor benefits, the court held that the
beneficiaries under the will would not receive a credit. Id. The court also held that the
trial court did not err in its refusal to allow the ex-wife's claim for attorney's fees because
the issue of attorney's fees was beyond the subject of the remand. Id.
90. 901 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.).
91. Id. at 525.
92. Id.
93. TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCr, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. title
2, subtitle G (Vernon Supp. 1995).
94. 901 S.W.2d at 523.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 525.
97. 902 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ requested).
98. Id. at 86-87.
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filed a medical malpractice suit against the estate through its independent
executor. The appellants obtained a judgment against the estate on Feb-
ruary 19, 1993, at which point the contingent claim against the estate be-
came a liquidated rather than a contingent claim. On April 20, 1993, the
probate court granted letters of administration in the decedent's estate
and allowed the estate administration to change from independent to de-
pendent. The appellants contended that they perfected the requirement
of legal exhibition of their claim when they filed suit against the in-
dependent executor and that their claim should be a class seven claim.
The probate court determined that the claim was a class eight claim,
rather than a class seven claim. The appeals court held that, in the case of
a contingent claim, filing suit on the claim is the same as legally exhibiting
the claim, so that the probate court should have classified the claim as a
class seven claim since the appellants filed suit against the executor within
six months of the original grant of letters testamentary. 99
B. PUBLISHED NOTICE
In Gilbert v. Jennings,1°° the court held that a publisher's affidavit con-
cerning the publication of notice may be filed after the estate is closed if
the publication itself was timely.' 0 ' The decedent died in January 1989,
and the local newspaper published the notice to creditors concerning his
estate in April 1989, but no one filed the publisher's affidavit concerning
the publication at that time. Following the decedent's death, a creditor
sued the decedent's widow on a deficiency following a foreclosure during
the decedent's lifetime. The widow filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, and the creditor responded, alleging that no record of published
notice existed in the probate proceeding. The widow filed the publisher's
affidavit and a copy of the published notice the day after the creditor filed
his response to her motion for summary judgment. She obtained a certi-
fied copy of the affidavit and notice and filed the copy in the record in the
summary judgment case. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the widow. In his appeal the creditor alleged that the trial court
should not have granted summary judgment since the widow did not
serve his counsel with a copy of the affidavit and notice. The court found
that the affidavit was of public record and could be filed at any time
before judgment.'0 2 The court further observed that the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 03 do not require service of public records filed in a
99. Id. at 87.
100. 890 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied).
101. Id. at 117.
102. ld TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) provides that certified public records may be filed
prior to the hearing or thereafter, but before judgment, with the court's permission. Be-
cause the certified copy of the affidavit was on file prior to the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment, the court found that the trial court could properly consider the evi-
dence. 890 S.W.2d at 117.
103. TEX. R. Cv. P. 166a(d) does not require service of public records, although it





In Carroll v. Carroll,10 5 the court examined the issue of whether a party
properly brought an action in district court when the independent admin-
istration in the decedent's estate was still pending in county court. 106 The
testator and her husband executed a joint and mutual will in 1960 in
which they left a life estate in their property to the survivor, with the
remainder to three named individuals. A farm was part of the joint estate
subject to the will. The testator's husband died in 1965, and the testator
offered the will for probate. The testator soon thereafter moved into a
nursing home which was owned by one of her nephews. The county court
appointed the nephew as the testator's guardian in 1978, and the nephew
filed an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims in the guardianship
several months later. The testator lived in the nursing home until her
death in 1986. Almost a year after the testator's death, the guardian filed
an application in the guardianship proceeding requesting the court to al-
low him to sell the farm. The nephew also filed a claim on behalf of the
nursing home, alleging that the testator's estate owed the nursing home
more than the purported value of the farm. The county court granted the
nephew's application, and the nephew sold the farm to his brother, as
trustee for the benefit of the nursing home, in order to satisfy the debt.
The county court confirmed the sale a few weeks later. A few months
later one of the beneficiaries of the joint and mutual will filed the will for
probate, and the court appointed the applicant independent executor.
No further probate actions took place in either the guardianship or the
decedent's estates. In 1991 the beneficiaries of the joint and mutual will
filed an action in the district court, in which they sought a declaratory
judgment that they owned the farm pursuant to the will and sought a
removal of cloud on the property's title, cancellation of the guardian's
deed, damages and attorney's fees. The district court declared that the
county court's order of sale and decree confirming the sale, as well as the
guardian's deed, were void, and that the beneficiaries under the will
owned the farm. The district court also awarded the beneficiaries dam-
ages and attorney's fees. The appeals court found that the county court
and the district court had concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter
in this case. 10 7 The court stated that the district court was the more ap-
P. 21 requires each party to serve pleadings and motions, but it does not require service of
public records filed in the action.
104. 890 S.W.2d at 117. The court held that the creditor did not preserve error for
review concerning the widow's failure to serve a copy of the affidavit since he did not
object to the affidavit at the hearing, and he did not move for the court's permission to file
a response. Id.
105. 893 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.). See infra notes 135-38
and accompanying text for a discussion of the guardianship issues in this case.
106. Id. at 66-67.
107. Id. at 66 (citing TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995)).
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propriate forum for this case since it involved title to real property.'08
The court held that the primary issues involved the determination of title
to the farm and that distribution of probate assets was incidental to the
relief that the beneficiaries sought, so the district court had
jurisdiction. 0 9
D. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
In Bryant v. Flint,"0 the court held that the decedent's wife was liable
to his estate for part of his income tax liability."' The decedent and his
wife were in the process of obtaining a divorce at the time of his death.
The decedent left his entire estate to his children. The decedent's wife
filed a declaratory judgment action asking for her share of community
assets, reimbursement for payments she made for her husband's separate
debts, and a family allowance. The executor and beneficiaries of the de-
cedent's estate and the wife entered into an agreed judgment settling the
dispute, under which the wife received certain property and abandoned
her claims for reimbursement and for her share of the community prop-
erty. The wife also agreed to pay one-half of any income tax liability for
any of the years of the marriage, limited to a cap of $75,000. The IRS
audited the couple's joint tax returns for three of the years of their mar-
riage and assessed a liability of more than $167,000. The wife requested
that IRS determine that she was an innocent spouse in connection with
some of her husband's tax shelters, and IRS later absolved her of all lia-
bility for the tax. The wife relied upon the IRS determination to refuse to
pay the estate any part of the income tax liability. The trial court found
that the wife owed one-half of the income tax liability under the terms of
the agreed judgment. On appeal the court examined the evidence sup-
porting the trial court's judgment, including the wife's knowledge that
IRS was auditing the joint tax returns at the time she signed the agreed
order and the fact that the wife listed the tax shelters under audit as com-
munity property in the inventory that she filed in the divorce proceed-
ing." 2 The court found that the wife agreed to be responsible for one-
half of any taxes, up to the cap of $75,000, when she signed the agreed
order, and that the IRS determination that she was not responsible for
any of the taxes as an innocent spouse did not relieve her of her responsi-
bility to pay the estate for her share of the taxes under the settlement." 3
108. 893 S.W.2d at 66. The court further noted that the county court had no jurisdiction
to consider a claim against the estate because of the independent administration. Id. (cit-
ing Klein v. United States, 539 F.2d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1976)); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 145(h) (Vernon 1980). Because the county court did not have jurisdiction over the claims
alleged in the beneficiaries' action, the court found that the district court had jurisdiction.
893 S.W.2d at 66-67.
109. Id. at 67.
110. 894 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
111. Id. at 400-01.
112. Id. at 400.
113. Id. at 400-01.
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In Tinney v. Willingham114 the court determined that the trial court
signed a judgment that purported to be an agreed judgment, although the
judgment conflicted with the terms of the parties' settlement agree-
ment.115 Several of the parties filed claims in the decedent's estate, which
the independent executor rejected. The claimants then filed suit on the
claims and the parties thereafter agreed to settle the claims. The parties
dictated the terms of the settlement agreement that they reached into the
record in open court. 1 6 Almost one year later the claimants made a mo-
tion for judgment, asking the court to sign and enter their proposed judg-
ment, which they had attached to her motion. The independent executor
objected to the proposed judgment, noting specific items on which the
judgment did not conform with the settlement agreement. The trial court
nevertheless signed the judgment and later denied the executor's motion
for new trial without a hearing. The appeals court found that the trial
court altered the settlement reached by the parties when it signed and
entered a judgment conflicting with the settlement agreement."17 The
court found that the trial court's judgment was unenforceable and re-
versed and remanded the case." 8
E. DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE
In Howell v. Murray Mortgage Co.,119 the court affirmed a summary
judgment that a due-on-sale clause contained in a deed of trust remained
in force against the administrator of the decedent's estate. 120 The dece-
dent executed a deed of trust in 1984 to secure the renewal of purchase
money debt on his residence. The deed of trust contained a due-on-sale
clause, which provided that the decedent must pay the full amount of the
indebtedness upon sale of the residence. The decedent died in 1986 and
his brother qualified as administrator of the decedent's estate. The ad-
ministrator determined that the claims against the estate were greater
than the personal property of the estate, and he sought permission from
the probate court to sell the decedent's real property, including the resi-
dence subject to the deed of trust. The administrator entered into a con-
tract to sell the residence on an assumption, with the administrator
agreeing to finance the equity in the house. The administrator requested
the mortgage company to execute a waiver of the acceleration clause
under the deed of trust, but the mortgage company refused to do so. The
sale of the residence property never closed because of the mortgage com-
114. 897 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, n.w.h.).
115. Id. at 544-45.
116. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 11.
117. 897 S.W.2d at 544. The court noted that the trial court must sign and enter a
judgment that exactly complies with the terms of the settlement. Id. (citing Wyss v. Book-
man, 235 S.W. 567, 569 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, holding approved)); Vickrey v. Ameri-
can Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex. 1976); Arriaga v. Cavazos, 880 S.W.2d
830, 833 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ).
118. 897 S.W.2d at 545.
119. 890 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
120. Id. at 83, 84.
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pany's refusal to waive the acceleration clause. The administrator sought
to have the probate court enter a declaratory judgment finding that the
due-on-sale clause did not apply to him, as well as an injunction requiring
the mortgage company to release the restrictions on sale of the property.
The probate court entered summary judgment in favor of the mortgage
company. On appeal, the court found nothing in law or public policy to
require a release from the due-on-sale clause. 121 The court further found
that the administrator was successor to the decedent, who was the origi-
nal borrower,122 . and that the due-on-sale clause was a covenant that
bound the administrator as successor. 123 The court held that the due-on-
sale clause did not unreasonably restrict the probate court's power over
administrations.' 24 The court finally held that the due-on-sale clause was
not an undue restraint on alienation. 2 5
F. MUNIMENT OF TITLE
In Estate of McGrew,126 the court upheld the admission of a will to
probate as a muniment of title almost fifteen years after the testator's
death. 27 At the time of the testator's death, his widow could not locate
his original will. She applied for and received letters of administration in
the decedent's estate. Soon thereafter, the widow's sister-in-law
remembered that she had borrowed the will for the purpose of using it as
a model for her own will. The sister-in-law returned the will to the
widow, who then applied for probate of the will in another county. The
testator's daughter opposed the probate of the will and ultimately won
her will contest on appeal. The widow sold some real estate that was
community property, one-half of which was included in the testator's es-
tate. Several years later the purchaser conveyed the real estate to a third
party. The testator's widow died in 1989, and in 1990 the testator's
daughter notified the current owners of the real estate that she claimed
an intestate interest in the property. The owners somehow obtained the
testator's will and offered it for probate as a muniment of title. The
county court admitted the will to probate as a muniment of title and the
daughter appealed. The appeals court first determined that the present
owners were not in default for failure to offer the will for probate ear-
121. Id. at 83. The court stated that although the administrator "has the absolute right
to administer the estate and dispose of the property . . . this right does not extend to
extinguishing a creditor's right to be paid upon the sale of the estate property." Id.
122. Id. at 84.
123. Id
124. 890 S.W. 2d at 86. The court stated as follows:
The probate courts are empowered to preside but they are not empowered to
rewrite loan agreements and require lenders to finance the sale of estate
property. Such power would certainly facilitate the sale of estate property
and would be of benefit to heirs but it is not within the power of the probate
court.
Id.
125. Id. at 87.
126. 906 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. App.-yler 1995, writ denied).
127. Id at 55-56.
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lier.128 The court noted that the present owners of the property did not
acquire it until some ten years after the testator's death, and they did not
learn of the daughter's alleged interest in the property until thirteen years
after the testator's death.129 The court also held that whether the testa-
tor's wife defaulted in failing to offer the will for probate or whether the
wife waived her rights under the will since she did not offer the will for
probate was irrelevant. 130 The daughter alleged at the trial level that her
father destroyed his will with the intent to revoke it, but the court found
that she offered insufficient proof of revocation.' 31
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
In Sarny Holding, Ltd. v. Letsos,132 the court considered whether the
incorrect listing of the plaintiff in judgment in a filed abstract of judgment
perfected a lien on the judgment debtor's property. 33 The guardian of
the estate of an incompetent person obtained a money judgment in 1973.
The guardian abstracted the judgment, filed the abstract in the appropri-
ate county records, and recorded subsequent abstracts in 1982 and again
in 1992. Each abstract contained the guardian's name in the style of the
case, but stated that the estate of the incompetent ward obtained the
judgment. The original judgment debtor sold the property and ultimately
the appellant received the property. The appellant attempted to remove
the cloud from the title of the property and requested the trial court to
declare that the heirs of the ward had no interest in the property. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the heirs of the ward. The ap-
pellant alleged on appeal that the abstract of judgment was insufficient
because it incorrectly listed the ward's name, rather than the guardian's
name, as the plaintiff in judgment. The court held that the county clerk
properly indexed the abstract. 34
128. Id. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 73(a) (Vernon 1980) provides that a court may ad-
mit a will to probate more than four years following the testator's death if the party making
the application for probate did not default in failing to offer the will within four years from
the date of death.
129. 906 S.W.2d at 56. The daughter alleged that the present owners should have of-
fered the will for probate as soon as they knew of her claim, but she offered no authority
supporting her allegation. The court held that the present owners did not default by failing
to offer the will for probate earlier. Id.
130. IdL
131. Id. at 57. The daughter claimed that her father had signed two original wills, one
being on plain paper and one on tissue paper. The proponents offered the tissue paper will
for probate. The daughter alleged that the tissue paper will was a copy and that her father
must have destroyed the plain paper copy with the intent to revoke his will, but she offered
no evidence of revocation. The court also considered the daughter's allegation that the will
was illegible due to markings that the sister-in-law put on the will when drafting her own
will, but the court held that the will was legible and that the sister-in-law fully explained
each of her markings. Id. at 58.
132. 896 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
133. Id. at 274-76.
134. Id at 275-76. The court noted that a purchaser would be on notice of a judgment
against the seller since the abstract correctly listed the defendant in judgment. Id. at 276.
The dissent would have held that the abstract did not create a valid lien since it improperly
listed the plaintiff in judgment. Id. at 276-77 (Hutson-Dunn, J., dissenting).
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In Carroll v. Carroll,135 the court held that a guardian had no power to
sell real property of the estate more than a year following the ward's
death.136 The guardian, who was the ward's nephew, also was an owner
of a nursing home in which the ward resided for more than twenty years
prior to her death. More than eleven months following the ward's death
the guardian filed an application to sell real property belonging to the
ward's estate. The guardian also filed a claim from his nursing home,
alleging that the ward's estate owed the nursing home more than the
value of the real property. The court entered an order allowing the sale
of the real estate, and the guardian sold the real estate to his brother, as
trustee for the nursing home. The court confirmed the sale. Several
years later the beneficiaries under the ward's will filed suit against the
guardian for cancellation of the deed, removal of cloud on the title to the
real property, damages, and attorney's fees. The trial court entered judg-
ment in favor of the beneficiaries of the ward's will. On appeal the court
noted that the only powers that a guardian has after the ward's death are
the powers required to settle and close the guardianship.137 The court
also found that a probate court only has the authority to require the
guardian to make a final accounting of the ward's estate following the
death of the ward, and that the probate court has no authority to allow or
confirm the sale of any of the ward's property following the ward's
death.138
VI. TRUSTS
A. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
In Anzilotti v. Gene D. Liggin, Inc.,139 the court determined that an
alleged trustee did not meet his burden of proof establishing that a trust
existed. 140 An individual, apparently in his individual capacity, entered
into a contract with a construction company for renovation of an existing
structure. The individual also entered into a letter agreement with an
architect in connection with the renovation. The letter agreement recited
that the individual was acting as trustee for a subsequently formed corpo-
ration. The construction contract provided that any claims arising from
the contract would be subject to arbitration. The construction company
sued the individual and his subsequently formed corporation on the con-
tract, and the individual and corporation counterclaimed. The individual
and his corporation also named the architect as a third party defendant to
135. 893 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.). For a discussion of the
estate administration issues in this case, see supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 68.
137. Id.
138. Id. The court also held that the district court's judgment was not a collateral at-
tack on the county court's approval and confirmation of the sale of the property since the
county court's orders were void. Id (citing Jones v. Wynne, 133 Tex. 436, 129 S.W.2d 279,
283 (1939)).
139. 899 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
140. Id. at 268.
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the counterclaims. The architect denied the claims and submitted his own
claim for services rendered. The parties submitted their claims to arbitra-
tion, and the arbitrator found that the individual and his corporation
should receive nothing from either the construction company or the ar-
chitect and that the individual and his corporation owed the construction
company and the architect substantial damages plus attorney's fees. The
individual appealed, partly on the basis that he should have no individual
liability since he was acting as a trustee. The court noted that the nota-
tion of the fiduciary capacity in the letter agreement provided evidence
that the individual intended to avoid individual liability.141 The court ad-
ded, however, that the alleged trustee has the burden of proving that he
has no individual liability,142 and the individual did not meet his burden
of proof.1
4 3
In Davis v. Ward,'" the court determined that an attorney who con-
tracted with a trust beneficiary for legal services in return for a portion of
the beneficiary's recovery could not intervene in a case between the suc-
cessor trustee and a bank. 45 The beneficiary engaged an attorney to rep-
resent him in connection with the trustee's alleged breach of fiduciary
duties and losses sustained when the trustee pledged trust assets for her
personal loans. The bank offset the trust assets when the trustee de-
faulted, which led to the beneficiary's concerns. The beneficiary sued the
trustee and the bank. The trustee resigned and appointed as successor
trustee another trust beneficiary, who then proceeded to pursue the cause
of action against the original trustee and the bank. The bank inter-
pleaded the amount that it contended were the trust funds on deposit.
The successor trustee requested the court to distribute the interpled funds
to the trust. The bank, the original trustee, and the successor trustee en-
tered into a settlement agreement, under the terms of which the bank
would pay the successor trustee additional funds in settlement of all
claims. The beneficiary who originally sued was not a party to the settle-
ment agreement. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the bank
paid no funds directly to the beneficiary. The trust agreement specifically
provided that the trustee could accumulate or distribute trust income and
could distribute trust principal to the beneficiaries on a per stirpes basis.
The trial court entered a judgment approving the settlement agreement
and specifically recited in the judgment that the beneficiary had no stand-
ing to make a claim against the bank and that the successor trustee had
the power to enter the settlement agreement. The trial court later or-
dered distribution of the interpled funds plus the settlement funds to the
successor trustee. At the final hearing on the matter, the court dismissed
the beneficiary's claims and denied the intervention of the beneficiary's
141. Id. at 267 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.084(b) (Vernon 1984)).
142. 899 S.W.2d at 267-68 (citing Nacol v. McNutt, 797 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14 Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
143. 899 S.W.2d at 268.
144. 905 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
145. Id. at 451.
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attorney. The attorney appealed the denial of his intervention, alleging
that the trial court improperly approved the settlement agreement. On
appeal the court determined that the trustee had discretion whether to
distribute any of the recovery to the beneficiary and that the beneficiary
had no present right to the recovery. 146 The court noted that the trial
court determined that only the trustee could enter the settlement agree-
ment and that the beneficiary, and thus his attorney, had no right to enter
the settlement agreement. 147
B. RESULTING TRUSTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
In Young v. Fontenot, 48 the court considered the issues of resulting
trust 49 and constructive trust.150 The appellant alleged that he entered
an oral agreement with two other men that he would provide services in
connection with establishing a club in exchange for stock in the corpora-
tion that would own the club. At the time the men entered the agree-
ment the corporation was not in existence. The men agreed that the
appellant would not receive any stock issued in his name because a third
party, who had agreed to assist the men in obtaining a liquor license for
the club, would not participate if the appellant participated. The other
men allegedly agreed to issue stock to the appellant at a later date. The
other two men formed the corporation and issued stock to themselves.
They then formed another corporation with the sole purpose of receiving
profits from the corporation that owned the club. More than two years
after the alleged oral agreement the appellant requested one of the other
men to issue the stock; when the other man failed to issue the stock, the
appellant filed suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the other two men, but did not specify the grounds on which it issued the
judgment. The appellant's trial pleadings requested the imposition of a
resulting trust on the stock of the corporations because he had earned the
stock through the services that he rendered to the corporations. The ap-
peals court noted that a resulting trust is an equitable remedy used to
prevent unjust enrichment' 5' and that it arises when someone other than
the one who has actually paid for the property takes title to the prop-
erty. 52 The court found that the appellant alleged that he earned stock
in return for services he provided, that the other men issued the stock in
their names to entice the third party to assist them with the liquor license,
and that the other men did not disprove the appellant's factual allega-
146. Id.
147. Id Because the beneficiary received no recovery from the bank and because the
beneficiary could not force a distribution from the trust, the beneficiary received no funds
from which the attorney's contingent fee could be paid. See id. at 450-51.
148. 888 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
149. Id. at 242.
150. Id. at 242-43.
151. Id at 242 (citing Nolana Dev. Ass'n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984)).
152. 888 S.W.2d at 242 (citing Tricentrol Oil Trading, Inc. v. Annesley, 809 S.W.2d 218,




tions. 153 The appellant also sought the imposition of a constructive trust
over stock that the other men held in a third corporation. The appellant
alleged that the others agreed to hold his stock in trust, that the others
issued the shares to one of them, and that the man who held the stock
refused to convey the stock to the appellant. The court held that the trial
court improperly entered summary judgment on the constructive trust
issue. 154
In Connell v. Connell, 55 the court considered, in the divorce context,
the issues of constructive trust 56 and resulting trust.157 The wife sought a
divorce from her husband, whom she alleged had benefitted friends by
assignments and gifts of community property. The wife alleged that her
husband and some of his friends had committed constructive fraud
against her by all of her husband's business dealings after their separa-
tion. The appeals court found that a fiduciary relationship exists between
a married couple and that each spouse must follow the fiduciary duty
when transacting business with community assets. 158 The court found
that the wife did not prove any constructive fraud on the part of her hus-
band or any third party, so the trial court correctly determined not to
submit the issues of constructive fraud and constructive trust to the
jury.' 59 The court further held that the trial court appropriately directed
a verdict on the resulting trust issue since the wife failed to prove that her
husband purchased property with community funds in another's name. 160
In Marineau v. General American Life Ins. Co.,161 the court held that
the trial court properly imposed a constructive trust over a portion of life
insurance proceeds.162 An agent for a life insurance company embezzled
funds from the company over a period of four years. The agent
purchased a policy on his own life, payable to his wife, and paid the pre-
miums on the policy from an account into which he deposited the embez-
zled funds. The agent committed suicide, and his wife requested payment
of the full face value of the insurance policy. The agent's wife conceded
that the agent had embezzled funds. The insurance company filed for a
declaratory judgment seeking imposition of a constructive trust over the
insurance proceeds and seeking a determination of its rights and the
153. 888 S.W.2d at 242.
154. Id. at 243. The court noted that a constructive trust is also an equitable remedy
used to prevent unjust enrichment. Id. at 242 (citing Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d
125, 131 (Tex. 1974)).
155. 889 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
156. Id. at 541-43.
157. Id. at 544.
158. Id. at 541. The court also noted that any third party who wittingly participates in
any breach of fiduciary duty involving the community estate may also have committed
constructive fraud. Id.
159. Id. at 543. Because the wife failed to prove constructive fraud, the trial court could
not have imposed a constructive trust over property held by any of the husband's friends or
business contacts. Id.
160. 889 S.W. 2d at 544.
161. 898 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
162. Id. at 400.
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wife's rights in the proceeds. An accountant testified concerning the pro-
portion of the agent's true deposits to his embezzled deposits to the ac-
count from which the agent paid the insurance premiums. The trial court
used the proportion determined by the accountant to determine the
amount of the insurance proceeds that the insurance company should re-
cover pursuant to the constructive trust. The wife appealed, alleging that
the trial court improperly placed upon her the burden of proving the pro-
portion of embezzled funds used for paying the premiums. The appeals
court noted that the party that seeks recovery of embezzled funds has the
initial burden of tracing the funds to specific property.163 The court
stated that once the party seeking recovery meets its initial burden of
proof, the burden shifts to the other party to prove that the purchase of
the specific property came from the purchaser's own funds, not embez-
zled funds.' 64 The court held that the trial court properly concluded the
wife had the burden of proving what part of the insurance premiums were
paid with her husband's own funds, rather than embezzled funds.165
VII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
A. WILLS
The legislature amended subsections (c) and (d) to section 58 of the
Probate Code to clarify the meaning of the terms "contents"' 66 and "ti-
tled personal property."'167 The legislature also amended section 69 of
the Probate Code, which voids provisions in a will that relate to a former
spouse once the marriage ends, to include annulment as well as divorce
unless the testator specifically provides otherwise in the will. 168
B. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
1. Probate Courts
The legislature created a statutory probate court in Denton County. 69
New section 15.007 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code provides
163. Id. (citing Meyers v. Baylor Univ., 6 S.W.2d 393,394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1928,
writ ref'd)). If the party seeking recovery of the funds traces the funds successfully, the
funds become subject to a constructive trust. 898 S.W.2d at 400; Moseley v. Fikes, 126
S.W.2d 589, 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939), affd, 151 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1941, judgm't adopted).
164. 898 S.W.2d at 400.
165. Id.
166. Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 642, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6197,
6197 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(c) (Vernon Supp.
1996)). The legislature amended the meaning of "contents" to include "titled personal
property." Id.
167. Id. (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
The legislature added tangible personal property represented by a "certificate of owner-
ship," (such as a stock certificate) to the definition of "titled personal property." Id.
168. Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 642, § 2, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6197,
6198 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
169. Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 328, §§ 1-3, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4851, 4851-52, 4856 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 25.0631-
32, 25.0635 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
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that the venue found in the Civil Practices and Remedies Code controls
over the venue provisions of the Probate Code and relates to suits by or
against a fiduciary for wrongful death, personal injury, or property dam-
ages. 170 The legislature also provided a procedure by which practicing
lawyers who are present may elect a special judge to hold court for any
Dallas County probate judge who fails or refuses to hold court. 171
2. Miscellaneous Estate Administration Revisions
The legislature amended Probate Code section 137, which concerns
small estate affidavits, to clarify or correct some of the existing language
and to set forth the requirements for a small estate affidavit. 172 An in-
dependent executor now may file an affidavit closing an estate if no pend-
ing litigation concerning the estate exists. 173 The legislature also
amended the emergency administration procedures. 74 Probate Code
section 520 now provides that an applicant may file for emergency proce-
dures to protect the decedent's personal property in the county in which
the property is located. 75 The legislature added new section 521A to the
Probate Code to set forth the requirements for emergency interven-
tion.176 The revision to Probate Code section 522 serves to clarify the
existing language, but also adds a provision that the applicant may not
have the decedent's remains cremated unless the decedent left specific
written instructions permitting cremation. 77 The legislature added Pro-
bate Code section 522A to set forth the contents for an application for
emergency intervention for access to the decedent's personal property.1 78
The legislature also added some clarification to section 523 concerning
the court's order of emergency intervention relating to gaining access to
170. Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1752,
1755 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.007 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
171. Act of May 4, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 95, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1575,
1575-76 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0596 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
172. Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S. ch. 642, § 3, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6197,
6198-99 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
173. Id. § 5 at 6200-01 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 151
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
174. Id. § 6-11 at 6201-05 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 520, 521A,
522, 522A, 523, & 524 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
175. Id § 6 at 6201 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 520
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
176. Id. § 7 at 6201 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 521A (Vernon
Supp. 1996)). An applicant may request emergency intervention only if no one has filed
for probate of the decedent's will or for administration of the decedent's estate and if the
applicant either needs funds to pay for the decedent's funeral and burial or needs to gather
the decedent's personal property from rented premises and cannot otherwise enter the
premises. Id.
177. Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S. ch. 642, § 8, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6202
(Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 522 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).




the decedent's personal property. 179 Section 523, as amended, allows the
person holding the decedent's personal property at the expiration of the
emergency intervention order to distribute the property to the decedent's
heirs or to certain creditors of the decedent. 180 The legislature added
new section 525 to the Probate Code, which provides for interested per-
sons to petition the court to limit the surviving spouse's rights to handle
burial or cremation arrangements if good cause exists showing that the
surviving spouse may have wilfully caused or aided in an act that resulted
in the decedent's death.' 8 '
3. Claims
The legislature enacted significant changes to the claims procedures for
estates of decedents dying after January 1, 1996.182 Independent execu-
tors now clearly must follow the same notice procedures as dependent
personal representatives, As well as approve, classify, and pay, or, alterna-
tively, reject, claims following the order of priority and classification fol-
lowed by the personal representative and court in a dependent
administration. 83 The legislature also overruled Texas Commerce Bank
v. Estate of Cox' 84 and Joffrion v. Texas Bank' 85 in new section 146(b),
which provides that secured creditors that elect "preferred debt and lien"
in an independent administration may not pursue a deficiency against
other estate assets. 186
Estate representatives must now give actual notice to secured creditors
within two months after receiving letters.187 Estate representatives may
now give actual notice to unsecured creditors stating that the creditor
must present a claim within four months of the notice or the claim will be
barred. 188 Creditors may present claims to the estate's representative at
any time during the estate administration unless the statute of limitations
bars the claim or the four month bar statute 189 bars the claims, which
179. Id. § 10 at 6203-04 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 523 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
180. Id. § 11 at 6204-05 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 524 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
181. Id. § 12 at 6205 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 525
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
182. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Tex. Legislature, R.S., ch. 1054, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 9367, 9367-85 (Vernon).
183. Id. § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9367, 9368 (Vernon) (codified as amended at
TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 146(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
184. 783 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
185. 780 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989), judgment vacated, 792 S.W.2d 456
(Tex. 1990) (pursuant to motion of dismissal).
186. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Legislature, R.S., ch. 1054, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
9367, 9367-68 (Vernon) (codified as added at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 146(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
187. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Legislature, R.S., ch. 1054, § 3, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
9367, 9369-70 (Vernon) (codified as added at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 295 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
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extends the period for presentation of claims beyond six months. 190 The
personal representative may now petition the court after six months from
receiving letters to order payment of allowed and approved claims if the
personal representative states in the application that it has no knowledge
of any additional enforceable claims.191
The legislature added a definition for "matured secured claims"' 192 and
provided remedies for holders of secured claims in dependent administra-
tions that elect preferred debt and lien status.' 93 If the court allows the
remedy of foreclosure, the secured creditor seeking the foreclosure must
file an application that describes the property, the amount of the out-
standing debt, the amount of the matured debt, and any other debts se-
cured by the property of which the secured creditor is aware. 94 Before
proceeding with foreclosure, the secured creditor must serve the personal
representative and any other known secured creditor with citation, 95 and
the court must find that a default has occurred. 196 Any interested person
may appeal the order of foreclosure. 197 If the secured creditor cannot sell
the property at foreclosure because the minimum price is too high, the
creditor may apply to the court for a modification of the sales price.198
C. GUARDIANSHIPS
The legislature enacted significant changes to the Guardianship
Code. 199 The legislature revised Probate Code section 676(d) to provide
that the court will appoint as guardian of a minor child the person desig-
nated in the parent's will or other written document, unless the court
finds that the designated person is deceased, is disqualified, refuses to
190. Id. § 5 at 9370-71 (Vernon) (codified as added at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 298
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
191. Id. § 21 at 9379-80 (Vernon) (codified as added at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 320(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
192. Id. § 9 at 9373 (Vernon) (codified as added at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
193. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1054, § 9, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9373-
75 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(e)-(k) (Vernon Supp. 1996)). A
holder of a preferred debt and lien may apply to the court for an order of sale of the
property and apply the proceeds to the matured debt, or for an order requiring a sale of
the property free of the lien and apply the proceeds to the payment of the entire debt, or
order foreclosure. Id at 9373 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(e)
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
194. Id at 9374 (codified TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(f) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
195. Id. (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(g) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
196. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(i) (Vernon Supp. 1996)). The court
also has discretion to set a minimum foreclosure sales price for the property. Id.
197. Id. at 9375 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306() (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
198. Act of May 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1054 § 9, 1995 Tex. Sess. law Serv. 9375
(codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(k) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
199. See Act of May 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 304, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4569,
4569-73 (Vernon); Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 642, § 13, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 6197, 6206 (Vernon); Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, 1995 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 9252, 9252-87 (Vernon).
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serve, or would not serve in the child's best interest.200 The legislature
added a provision that the surviving parent of an adult incapacitated per-
son may designate a guardian in a will or other written document, if the
parent served as guardian while living.20' The legislature also added the
requirements for the written declaration that parents may use to appoint
guardians for their children, including a sample form.202 Courts shall not
require bonds for guardianship programs operated by counties with a
population in excess of 2.5 million.20 3
The legislature enacted comprehensive legislation that removed incon-
sistent references to incapacitated persons within the Probate Code and
other codes, and made substantive changes to the Guardianship Code. 20 4
The legislature replaced Probate Code section 3(p) to provide a defini-
tion of "incapacitated person" and added section 3(mm) to define
"ward. '205 References formerly made to minors or incompetent persons
now refer to incapacitated persons. 206 In addition, references to guardi-
ans no longer appear in Probate Code sections 195(a) and 222(a) and
(b). 20 7 The legislature also enabled personal representatives of dece-
dent's estates to deliver property to the guardian of the estate of an inca-
pacitated person.208
The legislature amended Probate Code section 601 to add the defini-
tion of a "court investigator. '' 20 9 New section 633 contains the provisions
200. Act of May 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 304, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4569,
4569 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 676(d) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
201. Id. § 2 at 4570 (codified as added at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 677(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
202. Id. §3 at 4570-72 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 677A (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
203. Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 642, § 13, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6197,
6206 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 702 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
204. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9252
(Vernon).
205. Id. § 4 at 9253 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 3(p), (mm)
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
206. Id. § 1 at 9252 (codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 594.036(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 2 at 9252 (codified at TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.021
(Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 3 at 9252 (codified at TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 6687b (Vernon
Supp. 1996)); id. § 5 at 9253-55 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp.
1996)); id. § 6 at 9256 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 53(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996));
id. § 7 at 9256-57 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 8 at
9257 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 9 at 9258
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145(i) (Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 10 at 9258-59
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C (Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 11 at 9259 (codi-
fied at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 154A (Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 13 (codified at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 222(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
207. Act of May 27, 1995, ch. 1039, § 12, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9252, 9259 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 195(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996)); id. § 13 (codified at
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
208. Id. § 14 at 9261 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 405A (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
209. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, §15, 9252, 9265 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 601 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
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for notice and citation in guardianship proceedings.210 New section
642(c) provides that courts shall determine the standing of persons with
interests adverse to a proposed incapacitated person or ward by motion
in limine. 211 The legislature amended the procedures for hearings by sub-
mission in uncontested proceedings. 212
The legislature amended section 646, which concerns the requirements
for appointment as an attorney ad litem. 213 New section 648(f) clarifies
that the court visitor program does not apply to guardianships created
solely to receive funds from governmental sources.214 New section 648A
provides a list of the duties of a court investigator. 215 The legislature clar-
ified provisions relating to the renewal of letters of guardianship to pro-
vide that the annual accounting refers only to guardianships of the estate,
to add a reference to the annual report for guardianships of the person,
and to provide the date to which the renewal dates back, unless the court
has changed the accounting period.21 6 New subsection 660(b) provides
that the order appointing the guardian will provide the powers and duties
that the guardian will have after receiving letters of guardianship.217
The legislature clarified provisions relating to the compensation of
guardians to provide for compensation for temporary guardians, to set a
cap on aggregate compensation of the guardian of the person and the
guardian of the estate, and to exclude certain governmental benefits from
the definition of "gross income" for purposes of determining guardian
compensation. 218 New section 665A provides that the court may set the
amount of fee payments to attorneys and other professionals appointed
to represent the proposed ward's interests and order payment from the
proposed ward's estate or from county funds if the ward is indigent.219
New section 665B provides that the court may order payment from the
proposed ward's estate of compensation of an attorney who represented
an applicant who brought a guardianship proceeding. 220 New section
665C contains the language formerly found in section 772(b)-(e) and re-
210. Id. § 18 at 9266-67 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 633 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
211. Id § 20 at 9268 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE AN. § 642(c) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
212. Id § 21 at 9268-69 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 644 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
213. Id. § 22 at 9269-70 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 646 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
214. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039 § 23, 9270 (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 648(f) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
215. Id § 24 at 9270 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 648A (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
216. Id. § 25 at 9270-71 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 659(c), (d)
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
217. Id. § 26 at 9271 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE A'N . § 660(b) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
218. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, § 27, 9252, 9272-73 (codified as
amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 665 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
219. Id. § 28 at 9273-74 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 665A (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
220. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 665B (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
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lates to contingent fee arrangements with attorneys and reimbursement
for costs the guardian incurred in connection with collecting a debt or
obligation.221 Section 669 now provides that an applicant shall bear the
cost of the guardianship proceeding if a court investigator recommends
that no guardianship is necessary. 222
A minor age 12 or older may select a guardian or successor guardian,
with court approval.22 3 Section 684(a) sets forth what the court must find
by clear and convincing evidence and what the court must find by pre-
ponderance of the evidence before establishing a guardianship. 224 New
section 687 sets forth what a medical certificate must contain in a pro-
ceeding seeking guardianship of an allegedly incapacitated adult.2 2 5 The
legislature revised section 692 to delete provisions relating to the order
appointing a guardian and added language about the dismissal of an ap-
plication for guardianship. 226 Section 693 lists the findings of fact that the
court must make and specific language that the court must include in the
order establishing the guardianship.22 7 New section 694A, which relates
to the restoration of the ward, contains the language formerly found in
section 694(d). 228 The legislature expanded the scope of section 702,
which relates to the guardian's bond, to include guardianships of the es-
tate as well as of the person and to provide that the guardian of the estate
of a minor ward must post a bond even if the parent directed otherwise
by will.229
The guardian of the person must annually return a sworn written report
detailing receipts and disbursements, whether or not a guardian of the
estate exists.230 If the guardian does not timely file the annual report, or
any other account, exhibit or report, the court may revoke the letters of
guardianship, fine the guardian up to $1,000, or both.2 31 If a guardian
221. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 665C (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
222. Id. § 29 at 9274-75 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 669(b) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
223. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, § 31, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9252,
9275-76 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 680 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
224. Id § 33 at 9277-78 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 684 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
225. Id. § 35 at 9278-79 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 687 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
226. Id. § 38 at 9280-81 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE AnN. § 692 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
227. Id. § 39 at 9281-82 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 693 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
228. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, § 41, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9284(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 694A (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
229. Id. § 42 at 9284-85 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 702 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
230. Id. § 44 at 9252, 9285 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 743(a)(Vernon Supp. 1996)). The legislature also added new subsections (e)-(i) to § 743, which
relate to the court's approval of the annual report, waiver of filing fees and costs for the
annual report, and the timing of the annual report. Id § 45 at 9286 (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 743(e)-(i) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).




dies while serving as guardian, the guardian's personal representative has
the duty to account for and deliver the guardianship estate to the succes-
sor guardian.232 The court may order a guardian who has resigned to
deliver all of the guardianship estate in the former guardian's possession
to the successor guardian. 233 If the court removes a guardian, it may im-
mediately appoint a successor guardian while not releasing the removed
guardian from its bond or discharging the removed guardian until ap-
proval of the removed guardian's final account.2 34 Only a guardian of the
estate may file suit on behalf of the ward. 235 A guardian must make a
report to the court within thirty days after lending money of the guardi-
anship estate, unless the court orders the loan. 236
If a court orders the creation of a management trust for the benefit of
the ward the trust will have the same cause number as the guardianship
proceeding. 237 The court may grant the trustee of a management trust
the same powers granted to a trustee under Subtitle B, Title 9, Property
Code.2 38 If the trustee of a management trust resigns or otherwise ceases
to serve as trustee the court may appoint a corporate fiduciary as succes-
sor trustee.239 Neither the guardian of the estate nor the surety for the
guardian of the estate have any liability for the acts or omissions of the
trustee of the management trust.240 Prior to distribution of the assets at
the termination of the management trust, the trustee must file an ac-
counting with the court providing the same information as required for a
guardian's accounting. 241
Applications for temporary guardianships must be sworn and the court
may appoint a temporary guardian if anyone contests an application for
appointment of a temporary guardian, for making a temporary guardian-
ship permanent, or for the appointment of a permanent guardian. 242 The
managing conservator of a minor child who does not have a guardian, as
232. Id. § 48 at 9287 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 759(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
233. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, § 49, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9287
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 760(g) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
234. Id. § 50 at 9287 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 761(e) (Vernon Supp.
1996)). The court may also order the removed guardian to deliver all of the guardianship
estate in the removed guardian's possession to the successor guardian. Id. (codified at
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 761(f) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
235. Id. § 52 at 9289 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 773 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
236. Id. § 56 at 9291 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 862 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
237. Id. § 57 at 9252, 9291 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 867
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
238. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1039, § 59, 1995 Tex. Sess Law Serv. 9292
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 868(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
239. Id. § 60 at 9292 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 869A (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
240. Id. § 62 at 9292 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 872 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
241. Id. § 63 at 9292 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 873 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).




well as the child's parent, may apply to the court for permission to sell
property belonging to the minor without the necessity for a guardianship,
so long as the property has a value less than $25,000.243 The legislature
also repealed sections located outside the guardianship provisions of the
Probate Code that relate to guardianships. 244
D. TRUSTS
The legislature amended Trust Code provisions relating to the attorney
general's involvement in proceedings related to charitable trusts.245 The
legislature revised the provisions concerning notice to the attorney gen-
eral of proceedings involving charitable trusts by adding a provision that
the parties must notify the attorney general of any new causes of action
alleged in or parties added to a proceeding in which the attorney general
previously waived participation or declined to intervene.246 The legisla-
ture added a definition of "fiduciary or managerial agent" to Property
Code section 123.001247 and changed the references in Property Code
section 123.005, which concerns the venue of proceedings against a fiduci-
ary for its breach of fiduciary duty, to "fiduciary or managerial agent"
from "trustee. '248 The legislature also provided that certain charitable
organizations249 may serve as trustee of a trust of which the organization
is itself a beneficiary or which benefits another charitable organization if
serving as trustee furthers the purpose of the charitable organization. 250
The legislature amended the Trust Code definition of "interested per-
son" in an attempt to clarify when a person might have standing in con-
243. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.s., ch.1039, § 6B, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9252,
9294 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 889(a) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
244. Id § 73 at 9296-97 (repealing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 3(n) (definition of "habit-
ual drunkard"), 3(y) (definition of "persons of unsound mind"), 110 (persons disqualified
to serve as guardians), 111 (notice and citation on guardianship application), 112A (reports
in application for guardianship), 118 (minor's selection of guardian), 123A (continuation or
modification of guardianship), 127A (guardianship of missing person), 157 (incompetent
spouse), 159 (recovery of competency), 236 (expenditures for ward's education and main-
tenance), 236A (sums allowed parents for minor ward's education and maintenance).
245. Act of May 12, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 172, §§ 1-4, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3144, 3144-46 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
246. Id § 3 at 3145 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123.003(b) (Vernon Supp.
1996)). See also id. § 1 at 3144 (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § .115.011
(Vernon Supp. 1996)) (changes the reference section under which the attorney general
receives notice to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ch. 123).
247. Id § 2 at 3144-45 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123.001(4) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
248. Id. § 4 at 3146 (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123.005 (Vernon
Supp. 1996)).
249. Charitable corporations defined in I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c) (1986).
250. Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 914, § 21, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7956,
8119 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.31 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
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nection with proceedings involving a trust.251 The legislature also
amended Property Code section 113.111 to place regular payments from
income as charges against income rather than principal. 252
E. UNIFORM TRANSFERS TO MINORS Acr
The legislature adopted the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, which
replaces the Texas Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.253 A person may trans-
fer any type of property to a custodian for the benefit of a minor.254 The
custodian may accept lifetime gifts, 255 as well as gifts under a will or trust
instrument,256 from a guardian with court approval,257 or from obligors
who hold property for the minor or owe a liquidated sum to a minor who
has no guardian. 258 The legislature included a statutory form for creating
a transfer to the custodian.259 The legislature limited liability for both the
custodian260 and the minor.261 Custodial accounts created under the
Texas Uniform Transfers to Minors Act will terminate when the minor
attains age 21.262 The Texas Uniform Transfers to Minors Act applies to
transfers made after September 1, 1995.263
251. Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 642, § 14, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6197,
6206 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
252, Id. § 15 at 6206-06 (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.111
(Vernon Supp. 1996)). The legislature moved subpart (8) from subsection (b), which re-
lates to charges against principal, to subsection (a), which relates to charges against in-
come. Id. (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.111(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
253. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1043, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9310,
9310-32 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ch. 141).
254, Id. § 1 at 9310 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.002(5) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
255. Id. § 1 at 9312 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.005 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
256. Id. (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.006 (Vernon Supp. 1996)). The per-
sonal representative or trustee may appoint a custodian if the will or trust agreement does
not name a custodian or if all persons designated as custodian cannot serve for any reason.
Id. (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.006(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
257. Id. § 1 at 9312-13 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.007 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
258. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1043, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9312,
9313 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.008 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
259. Id. § 1 at 9315 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.010(b) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
260. I. § 1 at 9318-19 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §141.018(a), (b)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1996)). The custodian shall have no personal liability unless the custodian enters a
contract without revealing the custodial capacity and the custodianship or unless the custo-
dian personally is at fault for committing a tort while serving as custodian or for breach of
an obligation having to do with the custodial property. ld. (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 141.018(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
261. Id § 1 at 9319 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.018(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
262. Id. § 1 at 9321 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.021 (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
263. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1043, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 9312,
9321 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.022 (Vernon Supp. 1996)).

